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Abstract. A novel bankruptcy approach is proposed for re-
solving transboundary river conﬂicts in which the total wa-
ter demand or claim of the riparian parties is more than the
available water. Bankruptcy solution methods can allocate
the available water to the conﬂicting parties with respect to
their claims. Four commonly used bankruptcy methods in
the economic literature are used here to develop new river
bankruptcy solution methods for allocating water to the ri-
parian parties of river systems. Given the non-uniform spa-
tial and temporal distribution of water across river basins, the
proposed solution methods are formulated as non-linear net-
work ﬂow optimization models to allocate water with respect
to time sensitivity of water deliveries at different locations in
a river network during the planning horizon. Once alloca-
tion optimization solutions are developed, their acceptability
and stability must be evaluated. Thus, a new bankruptcy al-
location stability index (BASI) is developed for evaluating
the acceptability of river bankruptcy solutions. To show how
the proposed river bankruptcy framework can be helpful in
practice, the suggested methods are applied to a real-world
transboundaryriversystemwitheightripariansundervarious
hydrologic regimes. Stability analysis based on the proposed
stability evaluation method suggests that the acceptability of
allocation rules is sensitive to hydrologic conditions and de-
mand values. This ﬁnding has an important policy implica-
tion suggesting that ﬁxed allocation rules and treaties may
not be reliable for securing cooperation over transboundary
water resources as they are vulnerable to changing socioe-
conomic and climatic conditions as well as hydrologic non-
stationarity.
1 Introduction
Conﬂicts are integral to managing transboundary rivers due
to the externalities associated with growing demand and de-
velopment in riparian states. There are 148 riparian countries
creating about 276 transboundary river basins in the world
(De Stefano et al., 2012). These basins cover over 45% of
the Earth’s land surface and provide about 60% of the global
river ﬂows (Wolf et al., 2006). To facilitate cooperation over
transboundaryrivers,over400internationalagreementswere
signed in the 20th century (De Stefano et al., 2012), reﬂect-
ing a great potential for cooperation over transboundary nat-
ural resources (Wolf et al., 2006). However, the stability of
these agreements could be affected by socioeconomic and
political changes in the riparian states as well as climatic
and hydrologic variations. Dinar et al. (2010) reported 112
complaints about water deﬁcit in transboundary river sys-
tems during droughts and ﬂoods in the 1950–2005 period,
underlying the vulnerability of cooperation over transbound-
ary water systems to abnormal hydrologic conditions.
Game theory – the mathematical study of competition and
cooperation – is a useful method for studying transboundary
river management problems. Both non-cooperative and co-
operative game theory methods have been used in the past to
study transboundary water conﬂicts (Parrachino et al., 2006;
Madani, 2010).
Non-cooperative game theoretic methods are useful in
studying the strategic behaviors of riparian parties, feasi-
bility of cooperative solutions, and providing strategic in-
sights into the conﬂicts (Madani and Hipel, 2011; Madani,
2013). Example transboundary river conﬂicts analyzed by
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non-cooperative game theory concepts include the conﬂict
over ﬂooding of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers between
India and Pakistan (Rogers, 1969), the lower Mekong river
basin conﬂict between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet-
nam (Dufournaud, 1982), the Jordan river conﬂict between
Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria (Madani and
Hipel, 2007), and the Nile river conﬂict between Burundi,
Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan,
Tanzania, and Uganda (Elimam et al., 2008). These meth-
ods normally rely on qualitative information to ﬁnd the likely
outcomes of conﬂicts based on various stability deﬁnitions,
which incorporate a range of decision makers’ (players’)
characteristics such as risk attitude, foresight level, and in-
formation quality (Madani and Hipel, 2011; Madani, 2013).
While these methods provide valuable insights into strategic
conﬂictsandcanhelpﬁndpossibleresolutionstotheconﬂict,
their results are not necessarily quantitative and in most cases
are only appropriate for studying as games with discrete so-
lutions (strategies or actions).
Cooperative game theory solution methods normally seek
to allocate the incremental beneﬁts of cooperation (cost sav-
ings, added values, etc.) among the cooperating parties. In
the context of transboundary river management, coopera-
tive game theory concepts can be used to develop func-
tional water allocation schemes. Example transboundary
river conﬂicts analyzed by cooperative game theory include
the Ganges river conﬂict between Bangladesh and India
(Kilgoure and Dinar, 2001), the Euphrates and Tigris rivers
conﬂict between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey (Kucukmehmetoglu
and Guldmen, 2004), and the Syr Darya river basin conﬂict
between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan (Teasley
and McKinney, 2011). Cooperative game theory methods
are appropriate for quantitative problems with a continuous
solution domain.
Differentresourceallocationmethodshavebeenemployed
in the water resources literature to increase systems’ efﬁ-
ciency and minimize conﬂicts. Social welfare maximization
is perhaps the mostly commonly used approach for water
allocation in the literature. Based on this approach, a so-
cial (central) planner seeks to maximize the system-wide
beneﬁts assuming there is perfect cooperation among the
water users. The social planner approach pays minimal at-
tention to individual gains and distribution of total beneﬁts
among the beneﬁciaries, making it less practical (Madani and
Hooshyar, 2014).
Marketmechanismsandcooperativegametheoryschemes
are among the other water allocation methods that are used
to make the social planner’s solution practical. These meth-
ods focus on redistribution of the incremental beneﬁts of
cooperation and create win–win allocation solutions that
make cooperation attractive to individual rational beneﬁcia-
ries (Madani and Hooshyar, 2014). While these methods are
promising, their application is limited to problems in which
utility information is available for all parties and the incre-
mental beneﬁts of cooperation can be determined. There-
fore, challenge remains in developing cooperative schemes
for managing shared water systems for which utility infor-
mation might not be readily available, agreeable, or reliable
(common in transboundary river systems).
Operations research-based allocation methods (Madani et
al., 2014a; Read et al., 2014) have also been employed in
the water resources literature to allocate water. These meth-
ods are appropriate for problems with both discrete and con-
tinuous solutions and can be applied with and without util-
ity information. However, as shown by Read et al. (2014),
they seek distribution of dissatisfaction in an “optimal” way,
disregarding the stability of allocation solutions. Therefore,
their acceptability is questionable, making them less practi-
cal in real world.
Bankruptcy methods (O’Neil, 1982; Aumann and
Maschler, 1985; Dagan and Volij, 1993) comprise another
group of allocation methods used in the water resources
literature for water allocation in the presence and absence of
utility information (Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008;
Ansink and Ruijs, 2008; Ansink and Weikard, 2012; Madani
and Zarezadeh, 2012; Mianabadi et al., 2013; Madani and
Dinar, 2013). These methods are promising due to their
cooperative game theoretic nature and their attention to indi-
vidual gains under different conditions (e.g., homogeneity
of claims). However, as will be discussed in the following
section, the previous applications of bankruptcy methods
do not set an appropriate basis for using these methods
for solving transboundary river allocation problems with
temporal and spatial ﬂow variability.
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap of pre-
vious transboundary conﬂict resolution studies by develop-
ing a new bankruptcy-based water allocation mechanism
that: (1) does not necessarily require the players’ utility in-
formation (e.g., economic beneﬁts of each beneﬁciary from
the allocated water); (2) its application is not limited to prob-
lems in which cooperation must result in extra quantiﬁable
beneﬁts and (3) provides allocations solutions with respect
to the temporal and spatial variability of water ﬂows in trans-
boundary river systems.
2 River bankruptcy problem
2.1 General description
Water conﬂicts can develop when the yield of a water system
is not sufﬁcient to fully satisfy the demands of all beneﬁ-
ciaries. Such a situation is similar to a bankruptcy state in
which the total assets of an individual/entity are not enough
to fully satisfy their/its debts. In other words, in a bankruptcy
problem the total value of the claims of the beneﬁciaries is
more than the value of the available resource. Such a sim-
ilarity between water allocation problems and bankruptcy
problems has been the main motivation for using bankruptcy
methods, rooted in the economics and mathematics literature
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(O’Neil, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985; Dagan and
Volij, 1993) to solve water resources bankruptcy problems
(Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008; Ansink and Ruijs,
2008; Sheikhmohammady et al., 2010; Grundel et al., 2011;
Ansink and Weikard, 2012; Madani and Zarezadeh, 2012;
Mianabadi et al., 2013; Madani and Dinar, 2013).
Bankruptcy methods can be categorized as cooperative
game theory solutions (Sheikhmohammady and Madani,
2008). Nevertheless, these methods are different in princi-
ple from the commonly used cooperative game theory meth-
ods such as Nash–Harsanyi bargaining solution (Harsanyi,
1959), Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), and the nucleo-
lus method (Schmeidler, 1969), among others. While the
bankruptcy methods focus on allocation of the total deﬁcit
(the difference between the total claim and the value of the
available resource) among the parties, commonly used coop-
erative game theoretic solution methods have been primarily
developed for allocation of the incremental beneﬁts of co-
operation among the cooperating parties. Therefore, they are
not readily applicable to the bankruptcy situations with no in-
cremental beneﬁt from cooperation, or to cases in which the
available information about the utilities of the parties from
their resource shares are missing or are not reliable.
In some river basins, developing agreeable utility func-
tions to estimate the utility (e.g., economic gain) of each ri-
parian from its water use is very challenging due to the lack
of trust and information as well as the absence of cooperative
tendencies in the region. Therefore, river sharing games are
often played as zero-sum games in which parties are mainly
bargaining about their volumetric shares from the river, while
in reality, due to the difference in the non-linear utility func-
tions of the parties these games are not zero-sum (Madani,
2011; Madani and Lund, 2012). In fact, the zero-sum per-
ception of the riparian parties is one of the main reasons for
competition rather than cooperation, which makes economi-
callyefﬁcientcooperativegametheoreticinstitutionsorother
mechanisms such as water trading and markets impractical
and unacceptable. To address these issues, bankruptcy meth-
ods can be applied for developing water allocation solutions.
Although bankruptcy methods provide solutions which are
economically less efﬁcient than those provided by common
cooperative game theory methods, they are potentially more
publicly acceptable and practical. Most bankruptcy methods
are based on common sense and are relatively easy to un-
derstand by the general public, unfamiliar with the economic
principles and fairness rationales of the mathematically so-
phisticated cooperative game theory methods. This advan-
tage has been the main reason for the success of some of the
bankruptcy methods in practice since ancient times in dif-
ferent eras and locations. The proportional cutback principle
is an example of one of the oldest bankruptcy methods that
has been widely used for water resources management dur-
ing droughts in different areas of the world (e.g., qanat water
allocation in the Persian Empire and groundwater allocation
in California.)
2.2 Essential elements
The two essential elements of a bankruptcy problem include
(1) the amount of resource available and (2) the values of
beneﬁciaries’ claims. In most water resources bankruptcy
problems, the ﬁrst element simply equals the available water
tobeallocatedtothebeneﬁciariesinagivenlocationataspe-
ciﬁc time. Also, ﬁnding the claim values is straightforward
in some water systems (e.g., claims of groundwater users in
the case of groundwater bankruptcy are determined based on
their groundwater rights in a regulated system). Therefore,
bankruptcy solutions have been already used in the literature
for solving water allocation problems with known (predeter-
mined) claims and/or without temporal and spatial variabil-
ity in resource availability/access (Sheikhmohammady and
Madani, 2008; Ansink and Ruijs, 2008; Sheikhmohammady
et al., 2010; Grundel et al., 2011; Ansink and Weikard, 2012;
Mianabadi et al., 2013; Madani and Dinar, 2013). Neverthe-
less, solving transboundary river bankruptcy problems with
original bankruptcy methods can be challenging for two rea-
sons: (1) the lack of an acceptable method by all parties to
estimate the credible claims of the beneﬁciaries and (2) the
temporal and spatial change of the ﬂow along the river basin.
2.3 Claims
Determination of the beneﬁciaries’ claims in transboundary
water systems is challenging and highly controversial due to
the lack of information, unreliability of parties’ claims and
narratives, and absence of a globally acceptable framework
for determining the credible claims of riparian parties. Thus,
in Sect. 4 this paper suggests three different possible claim
estimation methods for transboundary river bankruptcy prob-
lems with potential applications in real-world water conﬂicts.
2.4 Physical constraints: spatial and temporal
variability
Classical bankruptcy methods assume homogenous resource
accessibility and are appropriate for one-shot allocation
problems. Therefore, they are not necessarily applicable to
problems with temporal and spatial heterogeneity in resource
availability. Due to the change of the ﬂow over time and
space, especially in river systems with multiple tributaries,
water availability might be limited at a given location at a
speciﬁc time. Therefore, original bankruptcy methods may
produce infeasible allocation solutions for river systems.
While temporal resource variability has not been consid-
ered in previous bankruptcy studies, few studies have tried to
address the spatial variability of resource in bankruptcy prob-
lems. Ilkılıç and Kayı (2012) formulated a network (graph)
model for bankruptcy allocation with respect to the possi-
ble geographical and infrastructural constraints in distribut-
ing the resource among beneﬁciaries. While their method
satisﬁes the fairness principle, i.e., “equal treatment of the
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equals”, it considers “no restrictions on the possible net-
works between sources and agents” (Ilkılıç and Kayı, 2012).
Therefore, their model is not generally applicable to river
sharing problems in which the physical characteristics of the
resource (river) system impose restrictions on networks be-
tween sources (river sections) and agents (riparian parties).
In another study, Ansink and Weikard (2012) proposed a
sequential allocation approach for solving river bankruptcy
problemsusingclassicalbankruptcymethods.However,their
method is only applicable to linear river systems with a sin-
gle tributary, and is based on some assumptions which might
limit its applicability to complex multi-tributary transbound-
ary river systems involving equally powerful parians seek-
ing equal treatment of the equals (Mianabadi et al., 2013;
Zarezadeh et al., 2014).
This paper proposes a new approach for solving trans-
boundary river bankruptcy problems with consideration of
the constraints imposed by the temporal and spatial variabil-
ity of water ﬂows within river networks. The general char-
acteristics of the proposed method are discussed in the next
section. While transboundary water allocation motivates this
work, the proposed method is applicable to other bankruptcy
problems with temporal and spatial resource availability con-
straints. Suggested examples of such problems by Ilkılıç and
Kayı (2012) include aid relief during and after disasters, util-
ity (gas, electricity, water) distribution in supply shocks, and
common property ﬁsheries.
2.5 Acceptability
Given that the developed bankruptcy allocation solutions
havenopracticalvalueunlesstheyareacceptableandconsid-
ered to be fair by the beneﬁciaries, evaluating the acceptabil-
ity of the developed solutions is essential. Ex post analysis
of the stability of allocation solutions is common in the wa-
ter resources literature (e.g., Dinar and Howitt, 1997; Teasley
and McKinney, 2011; Madani and Dinar, 2012; Read et al.,
2014; Madani and Hooshyar, 2014). Once different alloca-
tion solutions are developed, the stability of solutions is nor-
mally evaluated using quantitative measures to determine the
solutions with higher potential acceptability. Alternatively,
an axiomatic (ex ante) approach can be adopted for allo-
cation stability evaluation. Based on this approach, which
is more common in the economics literature, the attractive-
ness of allocation rules is evaluated based on their proper-
ties such as monotonicity or independence properties, with
respect to various possible perturbations of the problem at
hand (Herrero and Villar, 2001; Thomson, 2003).
Ideally, the results of both approaches should coincide and
this needs to be veriﬁed by future research. Nevertheless, the
water resources literature tends to commonly use the ex post
approach, ﬁnding it more attractive from the practical stand-
point. In practice, developing a compromise over an ex ante
approach, before clarifying to the beneﬁciaries what their
actual gains would be, more challenging unless decision is
made by an authorized intervener (e.g., social planner, gov-
ernment, or regulator), whose decision is enforceable and ac-
ceptable by all parties. In the ex post approach, on the other
hand,multipleallocationsolutionswithtransparentutilityin-
formation (i.e., volumetric gains in case of river bankruptcy)
can proposed to the negotiators. This expands the feasible
solution set and creates more opportunities for cooperation
through providing “substance” to negotiations (Bruce and
Madani, 2014).
What makes the application of an ex ante approach even
more complex in of river bankruptcy problems is the asym-
metric accessibility of the resource (water) at a given time
and location. Therefore, even if the solution properties are
reasonable, the actual solutions (volumetric allocations in
this case) will be affected by the physical limitations of the
system. Thus, the same solution principles might not yield
similar results in two river bankruptcy problems with simi-
lar claims and total water availability as the physical aspects
of the system can make the actual allocations different, i.e.,
water might not be available at a given location at a given
time, as desired based on the allocation rule. This makes
the axiomatic approach less practical as it does not guaran-
tee feasible allocation solutions based on a given allocation
rule, failing to provide clear information to the parties about
their actual gains. Therefore, an ex post stability evaluation
method is proposed and used in this study.
While various methods have been used in the literature
to evaluate the stability and acceptability of water alloca-
tion solutions (Dinar and Howitt, 1997; Madani and Dinar,
2012; Read et al., 2014), these methods cannot be readily
used to evaluate the acceptability of bankruptcy solutions.
Therefore, a new quantitative stability evaluation method is
developed in this study to evaluate the potential acceptability
of the proposed bankruptcy solutions.
2.6 Robustness
Normally, in water allocation negotiations, the amount of
available water in a given time-step (e.g., month) is deter-
mined based on the average historical ﬂow in that time-step.
Given that water ﬂows are different in dry, wet, and normal
years,waterallocationagreementscanvarydependingonthe
hydrologic conditions. Water allocation based on historical
ﬂows might make allocation agreements vulnerable to hy-
drologic variability, uncertainty, and non-stationarity. There-
fore, instead of relying on ﬁxed water shares, riparian par-
ties can try to agree over a ﬂexible allocation framework that
adjusts allocation solutions considering the changing con-
ditions of the system. This study seeks to propose a robust
bankruptcy solution framework that can provide water allo-
cation solutions that are not vulnerable to changing condi-
tions and can update allocations accordingly. Therefore, sta-
bility of the allocation solution is examined under different
hydrological conditions to determine if allocation rules and
solutions must be changed under different hydrologies or if a
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Figure1. Schematic map of a trans-boundary river network  Figure 1. Schematic map of a transboundary river network.
ﬁxed allocation rule can provide acceptable allocations that
are insensitive to hydrologic variability.
3 River bankruptcy allocation models
Figure 1 shows a schematic of simple transboundary river
system with multiple tributaries, a lake (sink) at the outlet
and m riparians (i = 1, 2, ..., m), each having different types
of water demand (e.g., domestic, agricultural, and environ-
mental). Water bankruptcy occurs when the total demand of
the riparians exceeds the stock of water. Bankruptcy rules
can be applied to allocate the available water to the riparians
with respect to their water demands (claims). In river sys-
tems, however, the classic bankruptcy rules might produce
infeasible allocation results due to spatial and temporal ﬂow
variability and water access heterogeneity. Thus, bankruptcy
rules must be modiﬁed to account for the physical character-
istics of the river network. We propose developing non-linear
network ﬂow optimization models that facilitate application
of four commonly used bankruptcy methods, namely pro-
portional (P), adjusted proportional (AP), constrained equal
award (CEA), and constrained equal loss (CEL) rules to river
bankruptcy problems, with respect to the water availability
constraints. These models have the following general char-
acteristics:
1. Each bankruptcy optimization model is based on a spe-
ciﬁc bankruptcy rule.
2. An allocation solution developed by a river bankruptcy
optimization model is always unique.
3. The allocation solution set developed by a bankruptcy
optimization model is always feasible, considering
the temporal and spatial ﬂow variability in the
river network.
4. The allocation solutions developed by a river
bankruptcy optimization model are expected to
satisfy the composition properties suggested by Ansink
and Weikard (2013) for river bankruptcy problems.
Nonetheless, composition properties have not been
used in this study to derive the bankruptcy solutions.
5. The bankruptcy optimization models seek “equal treat-
ment of the equals” to the extent possible. This means
that the bankruptcy optimization models minimize
hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) in the sys-
tem by equal treatment of all riparians regardless of
their location in the system (upstream vs. downstream)
and level of contribution to the total ﬂows. This char-
acteristic makes the proposed framework different in
essence from the methods proposed by Ansink and
Weikard (2012) and Mianabadi et al. (2013).
6. In the absence of water availability restrictions, a
bankruptcy optimization model based on a given
bankruptcy rule produces allocation results that
are identical to allocation solutions based on that
bankruptcy rule. In other words, when allocation
based on a given bankruptcy rule is feasible, original
bankruptcy solutions match the solutions produced by
the corresponding bankruptcy optimization model.
7. In presence of water availability restrictions (when the
application of original bankruptcy solutions methods in-
feasible allocation solutions), bankruptcy optimization
modelsminimizethedifferencebetweentheirallocation
solutions and the solutions based on the corresponding
original bankruptcy rules.
8. Water allocations to riparians with equal claims are not
necessarily equal in river bankruptcy problems, due to
the uneven access to water along the river system.
9. A bankruptcy optimization model can be applied to any
river network, irrespective of its physical characteristics
(shape, number of tributaries, number of riparians, etc.).
10. Each river bankruptcy optimization model satisﬁes the
following initial, mass balance (ﬂow continuity), and
non-negativity constraints:
Ti,t = Ii,t +Oi−1,t ∀i, (1)
Oi,t = Ti,t −Si,t ∀i, (2)
O0,t = 0, (3)
Om,t = Dt, (4)
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Si,t ≥ 0 ∀i, (5)
Si,t ≤ Ti,t ∀i, (6)
m X
i=1
Si,t ≤ Et, (7)
Et =
m X
i=1
Ii,t −Dt, (8)
where for i = 1, 2, ..., m in a given time step t: Ti,t is
thetotalavailablewaterinripariani’sterritory(decision
variable); Ii,t is the riparian i’s contribution to the river
system through the tributaries originating in its territory
(known variable); Oi,t is the total outﬂow from ripar-
ian i to the downstream riparian state (i +1) (decision
variable); Si,t is the allocated water supply to riparian
i in each month (decision variable); Dt is the sink de-
mand at the system’s outlet (known variable); and Et is
the total asset water (available water) to be shared in the
bankruptcy problem.
While the sink node at the system’s outlet can be treated
as a riparian, here we assume that the environmental
need of the sink has a high priority. Therefore, Eq. (4)
ensures that the lake’s environmental demand is fully
met.
11. A bankruptcy optimization model is only appropriate
for a bankrupt river system in which the total demand
exceeds the total available water. This makes Et ≤
m P
i=1
Ci,t a necessary condition for validity of the opti-
mization model, where Ci,t is the claim (demand) of ri-
parian i in time step t (known variable).
12. The amount of water allocated to a riparian party i (by a
river bankruptcy optimization model) never exceeds its
claim/demand. Thus, all bankruptcy optimization mod-
els satisfy the following constraint:
Si,t ≤ Ci,t ∀i, (9)
In the case of downstream excess ﬂow, i.e., when wa-
ter availability is more than the claim of the down-
stream riparian, this riparian must be excluded from the
river bankruptcy problem, as technically this riparian
is not expected to be subject to any conﬂict of water
allocation.
Sections 3.1–3.4 present the mathematical formulations
for each of the proposed river network bankruptcy optimiza-
tion models. All river bankruptcy optimization models are
subject to Eqs. (1)–(9). One advantage of using a network
bankruptcy model is that it can be applied to any river net-
work with any shape. Thus, the river network should not
necessarily match the natural river system and it can include
water diversion/transfer infrastructure (already developed or
under consideration during allocation negotiations). It must
be noted that while the proposed models have been devel-
oped for river networks, they are generally applicable to any
network bankruptcy problem in which the agents’ accessibil-
ity to the resource can be determined based on the network
structure.
Given the time sensitivity of water deliveries, water solu-
tions must be found using an appropriate time-step to prevent
disruption in water deliveries to any riparian party. In sys-
tems without enough storage capacity to regulate and carry
over water, smaller time-steps (e.g., months) can be used as
the basis of allocations. In this case, allocations are time spe-
ciﬁc and can be done for each time-step independently, i.e.,
the bankruptcy rule is applied to a given time-step (e.g., 1
month) during the planning horizon (e.g., 1 years), based on
the water availability and claims in that month only, regard-
less of the allocations in other months. In regulated systems,
operations are more ﬂexible. Thus, bankruptcy rules can be
applied to the whole planning horizon
Bankruptcy optimization models in this case is that spe-
ciﬁc concerns of the riparian parties during the planning
horizon as optimization constraints. Examples of such con-
straints would be minimum acceptable water supply, mini-
mum environmental ﬂow, minimum reservoir storage/energy
head for hydroelectricity generation, maximum/minimum
temperature, minimum acceptable reliability/resiliency of
water supply, and maximum acceptable vulnerability of wa-
ter supply at particular points within the river network in a
given time (e.g., day, week, month) during the planning hori-
zon (e.g., year).
In this study, the proposed modeling framework is applied
to an unregulated system for which bankruptcy (cutback) al-
location decisions in each time-step are independent from
other time-steps.
3.1 Proportional (P) rule
The P rule satisﬁes an equal proportion of the creditors’
claims. Based on this ancient bankruptcy method, the equal
portion (λPi,t) is calculated by dividing the total available re-
source by total demand. The P rule’s water allocation opti-
mization model for river systems is proposed in the following
mathematical form:
Minimize λPt −
m Y
i=1
λPi,t, (10)
subject to:
λPi,t =
Si,t
Ci,t
∀i, (11)
λPi,t ≤ λPt ∀i, (12)
where for i = 1, 2, ..., m in a given time step t: λPi,t is the
riparian i’s proportional allocation coefﬁcient (decision vari-
able), and λPt is the maximum proportional allocation coef-
ﬁcient (decision variable). This optimization model tries to
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minimize the latter variable. The second term in the objec-
tive function ensures that the model has a unique solution
and the agents’ allocation coefﬁcients (λPi,t) are as close to
each other as possible. The minimum objective value for a
given problem is achieved when the riparians’ allocation co-
efﬁcients are equal. In that case, λPt = λPi,t and the propor-
tional allocation coefﬁcients match the proportional cutback
rate under the original bankruptcy rule, which is equal to
Et
m P
i=1
Ci,t
. This case occurs when the ﬂow variability does not
make the original bankruptcy rule infeasible.
3.2 Adjusted proportional rule (AP)
Based on this rule (Curiel et al., 1987), what remains for ben-
eﬁciary i once all other creditors are satisﬁed is the basis for
allocation. To determine the initial amount of allocation to
creditor i, the summation of claims of all other beneﬁciaries
is compared with the available stock of water. In the case of
surplus, the initial allocation to riparian i is equal to the re-
maining water stock once the demands of all other riparians
are satisﬁed. Otherwise, the initial allocation to i is set to 0. It
is assumed that the initial allocation calculated through this
procedure is agreeable by all beneﬁciaries. Once initial allo-
cations are determined, claims are revised. The revised claim
of a given beneﬁciary is set equal to the minimum of the
remaining water stock and the difference between the ben-
eﬁciary’s initial claim and its initial allocation. The P rule
is then applied to the remaining water stock and the revised
claims.
The mathematical formulation of the AP rule’s river
bankruptcy optimization model is proposed as follows:
Minimize λAPt −
m Y
i=1
λAPi,t, (13)
subject to:
Ri,t =
X
j6=i
Cj,t ∀i, (14)
υi,t =
Et −Ri,t +|Et −Ri,t|
2
∀i, (15)
C∗
i,t = Min(Ci,t,Et) ∀i, (16)
λAPi,t =
Si,t −υi,t
C∗
i,t −υi,t
∀i, (17)
λAPi,t ≤ λAPt ∀i, (18)
λAPt ≤
Et −6m
i=1υi,t
6m
j=1,j6=i(C∗
j,t −υj,t)
∀i, (19)
where for i = 1, 2, ..., m in a given time step t: Ri,t is the
summation of all riparians’ claims excluding riparian i; υi,t
is the initial allocation to riparian i (amount of water con-
ceded to riparian i by all other riparians); λAPi,t is the riparian
i’s AP allocation coefﬁcient (decision variable), and λAPt is
the maximum AP allocation coefﬁcient (decision variable).
Similar to the P rule’s optimization model, the minimum ob-
jective value is achieved when the original bankruptcy solu-
tion is feasible and the optimized allocations match the al-
locations under application of the original bankruptcy rules.
The second term in the objective function ensures having a
unique solution and minimizes the differences between the
allocation coefﬁcients of the riparians.
3.3 Constrained equal award rule (CEA)
This ancient rule, adopted by rabbinical legislators (Dagan
and Volij, 1993) allocates the minimum of λCEAt and Ci,t to
all beneﬁciaries, provided that the sum of allocations equals
the total available resource. CEA tries satisfying the lower
claims to the extent possible in order to minimize the num-
ber of unsatisﬁed creditors. This rule is supposed to favor
the lower claims, normally belonging to weaker beneﬁcia-
ries who can be more affected by losses (Madani and Dinar,
2013). Based on CEA, the initial allocation to all beneﬁcia-
ries is equal to the lowest claim, provided that the sum of ini-
tial allocations does not exceed the demand. The fully satis-
ﬁed creditor is then excluded and the process continues with
theremainingcreditorsafterupdatingtheirunsatisﬁedclaims
as well as the remaining resource value. At any stage (includ-
ing the initial stage) when allocating an amount equal to the
lowest claim to all remaining creditors is not feasible (due to
insufﬁciency of remaining resource) the remaining resource
is distributed equally among all remaining creditors.
The mathematical formulation of the CEA rule’s river
bankruptcy optimization model is proposed as follows:
Minimize λCEAt −
m Q
i=1
λCEAi,t
(λCEAt)m−1, (20)
subject to:
λCEAi,t = Si,t ∀i, (21)
λCEAi,t ≤ λCEAt ∀i, (22)
where for i = 1, 2, ..., m in a given time step t: λCEAi,t is the
feasible allocation to the riparian i (decision variable), and
λCEAt is the highest feasible allocation to the creditors (de-
cision variable). The second term in the objective function is
to enforce a unique solution and to minimize the difference
between the allocations which would be equal in the absence
of resource accessibility limitations. Given that λCEAt can be
more than 1 (different from the λPt and λAPt which are al-
ways less than or equal 1) the second term is divided by a
positive number of comparable magnitude to ensure that the
second term is always smaller than or equal to the ﬁrst term.
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3.4 Constrained equal loss rule (CEL)
This rule can be viewed as the opposite of CEA, as it gives
priority to satisfying the highest claims (more powerful cred-
itors) ﬁrst. Once the highest claim is satisﬁed, the process is
repeated with the remaining resource and creditors. The pro-
cess stops at any stage (including the ﬁrst stage) if the avail-
able resource is not sufﬁcient to satisfy the highest claim of
the remaining creditors. At this stage, the remaining resource
is split equally among the remaining creditors. By doing this,
CEL allocates Ci −λCELi to all beneﬁciaries whose claims
are bigger than λCELt, allocating 0 to those who do not fall in
this category. Thus, the ﬁnal allocation to each beneﬁciary is
equal to max

0,Ci −λCELi
	
.
The CEL rule’s river bankruptcy optimization model is
proposed as follows:
Minimize λCELt −
m Q
i=1
λCELi,t
(λCELt)m−1, (23)
subject to:
λCELi,t = Ci,t −Si,t ∀i, (24)
λCELi,t ≤ λCELt ∀i, (25)
where for i = 1, 2, ..., m in a given time step t: λCELi,t is the
unmet claim of the riparian i (decision variable), and λCELt
is the maximum unmet claim of all riparians (decision vari-
able).
4 Example: the Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river
system bankruptcy problem
The proposed framework is applied to develop bankruptcy-
based water allocation schemes for resolving a real-world
transboundary river conﬂict in Iran. The Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud
river basin (Fig. 2) is located at the intersection of the Iran’s
Alborz and Zagros mountain ranges, with an area about
59400km2, making it the largest basin of the nation. The
basin overlaps with eight provinces (Kurdistan, Hamadan,
Zanjan, Eastern Azerbaijan, Ardebil, Tehran, Qazvin, and
Gilan) and the river provides the basis for important eco-
nomic activities in these provinces. The river eventually
ﬂows into the Caspian Sea in north of Iran, which is the
largest enclosed body of water in the world and the source
of more than 90% of the world’s caviar supply (Madani
et al., 2014b). Supplying the required environmental ﬂows
of the Caspian Sea is essential to the health of its valuable
ecosystem.
The study basin is not international. Nevertheless, inter-
provincial or interstate basins are effectively equivalent to
international basins as long as their boundaries do not match
political boundaries and they are managed by more than one
authority. The Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river system is an exam-
ple of a transboundary river basin, in which serious conﬂict
Figure 2. Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river system and its eight riparian
provinces.
has arisen as a result of recent socioeconomic (i.e., pop-
ulation increase and development), political (i.e., changes
in the water resources management structure), and hydro-
logic/climatic (i.e., frequent droughts) changes. As a result
of political changes in the country, the Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud
river system, which was historically shared by six Iranian
provinces and managed by only one water management au-
thority, is now shared by eight provinces and managed by
eight water authorities. As a result of population increase and
development in the region, each province is trying to increase
its share from the river and minimize the outgoing ﬂow, re-
sulting in signiﬁcant reduction of water ﬂowing into down-
stream provinces. To increase their uses from the river, the
upstream provinces have aggressive water resources devel-
opment plans. These development plans include construction
of multiple new reservoirs, which are currently under con-
struction or in the study phase. Complete implementation of
these plans will negatively impact the downstream provinces,
which historically have had more access to the river system
due to their stronger political and economic power as well as
higher populations. Therefore, the political tension has in-
creased in the basin, making the Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river
system the subject of one of the most intractable conﬂicts
over water resources in Iran. To show the utility of the pro-
posed model in solving transboundary water allocation con-
ﬂicts, the proposed framework is applied to derive new water
allocation schemes for the Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river system.
The ﬁrst step in solving river bankruptcy problems is de-
termining the legitimate claims of the riparian parties. This
step is challenging in unregulated systems without estab-
lished water rights. We propose three alternatives for deter-
mining the claims of the riparian parties in the example case.
These alternatives, which help setting the upper and lower
boundaries of the claims include:
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Figure 3. Estimated monthly claims of the riparian provinces based on the three proposed claim 
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Figure 3. Estimated monthly claims of the riparian provinces based on the three proposed claim calculation methods.
1. Historical uses: based on this alternative, historical uses
of the river system, revealed by the historical water use
data are set as the claims of the riparians. The water use
values are calculated based on the difference between
the recorded inﬂows and outﬂows of each province at
the hydrometric stations. This alternative sets the lower
claim boundary for each riparian.
2. Planned uses: Iran is currently the world’s third dam
builder with respect to the dams it has under construc-
tion (Madani, 2014). Several water storage projects are
under development at different locations in the ripar-
ian states of the Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river system. These
projects have been approved by the central government,
and are receiving ﬁnancial support from the central and
provincial governments. Each project has an associated
estimation of sectoral water demands (i.e., domestic,
agricultural, industrial, and environmental) used for the
calculation of the required storage capacity. Based on
this alternative, the total claim of each riparian is set
equal to the total documented water demands of differ-
ent river system-related reservoirs within the watershed
boundaries, which are already in operation or under de-
velopment.
3. Future uses: beside projects under construction, each ri-
parian state has plans for getting approval for construct-
ing additional water storage infrastructure to meet its
increasing water demand as a result of development.
Based on this claim estimation alternative, water de-
mands of these additional facilities will be added to the
water claims calculated based on alternative 2 only if
the construction plans of these facilities have been pub-
licly announced. This alternative sets the upper claim
boundary for each riparian.
Figure 3 indicates the estimated monthly water claims of the
riparian states of the Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river system based
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/18/3055/2014/ Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 3055–3068, 20143064 K. Madani et al.: Resolving conﬂicts over transboundary rivers using bankruptcy methods
 
Figure 4. Total annual claims (including Caspian Sea’s water demand) based on three different 
claim estimation methods and total annual water yield under three different hydrologic scenarios 
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Figure 4. Total annual claims (including the Caspian Sea’s water
demand) based on three different claim estimation methods and to-
tal annual water yield under three different hydrologic scenarios.
on the three proposed methods. Detailed calculations of the
water claims based on proposed claim determination alterna-
tives can be found in Zarezadeh (2011).
Given that allocation solutions can be sensitive to cli-
matic/hydrologic conditions, three different water availabil-
ity scenarios, representing three distinct hydrologic condi-
tions, normal (average), dry, and wet, were initially con-
sidered for solving the example river bankruptcy problem.
In the normal scenario, river ﬂows are based on the aver-
age monthly river discharges during the 1956–2006 period.
Dry scenario ﬂows match the average monthly river dis-
charges during the major drought of 1998–2001 in the re-
gion. The wet scenario ﬂows are based on the monthly ﬂows
during the 1968–1969 period. The annual river discharge un-
der the wet scenario will be sufﬁcient to meet the historical,
planned, and future claims of the riparian states as well as
the Caspian Sea’s (sink) water demand (Fig. 4). Therefore,
river bankruptcy problem is solved only for the normal and
dry cases.
Due to the unclear status of water rights/claims and the
future status of reservoir networks in the Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud
river system, this system is considered to be unregulated, dis-
regarding the possible beneﬁts resulting from coordination
of reservoir operation strategies in the basin. The problem
is solved using a monthly time-step and allocations are de-
termined in each time-step separately. Under this approach,
the total allocation to each riparian over the whole planning
horizon (e.g., one year) is the summation of bankruptcy allo-
cations in the existing time-steps within the planning horizon
(e.g., twelve months).
Figure 5 indicates the monthly water yield of the
Qezelozan-Seﬁdrud river system under the normal and dry
conditions as well as the total monthly claims of the riparian
parties (including the Caspian Sea’s water demand). This ﬁg-
ure clearly shows the water bankruptcy status of the example
river system for almost half of the year, especially in warmer
months with higher agricultural water demands.
The four proposed bankruptcy optimization models in
Section 3 were run under two hydrologic scenarios to calcu-
late bankruptcy allocations under normal and dry conditions.
The models were ﬁrst run on a monthly basis to calculate the
 
Figure 5. Total monthly claims (including Caspian Sea’s water demand) based on three different 
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Figure 5. Total monthly claims (including the Caspian Sea’s wa-
ter demand) based on three different claim estimation methods and
total annual water yield under normal and dry hydrologies.
monthly allocations. The summation of 12 monthly alloca-
tions based on each model with a given set of claims under
a given hydrology determines the corresponding annual allo-
cation of each province. The annual bankruptcy allocations
based on different bankruptcy models, claims, and hydrolo-
gies are presented in Fig. 6.
As expected based on the deﬁnition, the CEL method fa-
vors the creditor with the highest claim (in this case, the
downstream Province of Gilan). The opposite is true for the
CEA method which gives priority to satisfy the claims of the
creditors with lower claims (in this case, the provinces up-
stream of Gilan). The AP and P methods can be considered
as moderate allocation methods which result in allocations
that are between the high and low allocations estimated by
theothertwomethods.IncomparisonwithP,theAPmethod
allocates a higher share to the parties with lower claims and
a lower share to the parties with higher claims, trying to ad-
dress the bias toward higher claims in the P method. The
difference between the allocation values for different claims
and hydrologies underline the sensitivity of bankruptcy allo-
cation schemes to the difference in claim values and hydro-
logic conditions.
5 Stability evaluation
The suggested bankruptcy optimization models provide dif-
ferent allocation solutions, based on various notions of fair-
ness. Therefore, their acceptability is always questionable,
given that there is always at least one beneﬁciary who ﬁnds
one of the given alternatives unfair because they can gain
more under another rule (Madani and Lund, 2011). As one
of the most commonly used social choice (voting) meth-
ods (Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008; Madani et al.,
2014c), the plurality index can be considered as an indi-
cator of potential acceptability of a decision rule in multi-
participant decision-making problems. Based on this index,
the number of stakeholders who prefer one method to the
others is simply an indicator of the degree of acceptance of
that method (Dinar and Howitt, 1997).
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Figure 6. Satisfied annual water claim (%) of the riparian provinces based on different 
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Figure 6. Satisﬁed annual water claim (%) of the riparian provinces based on different bankruptcy solution methods for different claims and
hydrologies: (a) historical claim in a normal year, (b) historical claim in a dry year, (c) planned claim in a normal year, (d) planned claim in
a dry year, (e) future claim in a normal year, and (f) future claim in a dry year.
Table 1. Plurality index of different bankruptcy solutions for different claims and hydrologies.
Claim
Hydrology
Normal Dry
P AP CEL CEA Winner P AP CEL CEA Winner
Historical 0 0 1 6 CEA 0 0 1 6 CEA
Planned 0 0 1 6 CEA 0 1 1 5 CEA
Future 0 1 1 6 CEA 0 2 1 5 CEA
The higher the allocation to a riparian state, the more pre-
ferred the allocation rule (bankruptcy method) by that state.
Table 1 shows the plurality index (number of votes received)
of each bankruptcy solution method for different claim val-
ues under different hydrologies. The assumption is that each
party selects the allocation scheme that gives it the highest
share. Given that the Hamadan Province has no historical or
plannedclaim,itsvoteisonlycountedwhenfutureclaimsare
considered. Based on the plurality index, the CEA method,
which highly satisﬁes the riparians with lower claims (ma-
jority in this case) in both normal and dry conditions, is the
winner. However, given the absolute objection of the most
powerful province, i.e., Gilan, to this method, which allo-
cates low shares to this province, this solution is not practical
without strong intervention of the central government or pro-
viding strong cooperation incentives to Gilan.
The majority does not necessarily win in multi-participant
decision-making problems with asymmetric powers, espe-
cially when the minority group is powerful. Therefore,
the plurality index might not be appropriate for identify-
ing the feasible solution when there is a power imbalance
among the beneﬁciaries. Other methods can be used to quan-
tify the potential acceptability of allocation solutions (Read
et al., 2014). Loehman et al. (1979) used the following
power index (αi), originally developed by Shapley and Shu-
bik (1954), to evaluate the power of players in coopera-
tive game theory problems in which players seek the best
method for allocating the incremental beneﬁts of cooperation
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Table 2. Bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) values of different bankruptcy solutions for different claims and hydrologies.
Scenario
BASI
Normal Dry
P AP CEL CEA P AP CEL CEA
Historical 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.90 1.00 1.33 1.27
Planned 0.31 0.31 0.21 0.43 1.11 1.01 1.68 0.77
Future 6.57 6.49 3.48 9.65 1.01 0.95 1.54 0.73
to coalition members:
αi =
xi −x0
i P
jN
(xj −x0
j)
iN,
X
iN
αi = 1, (26)
where xi is the allocated cooperative beneﬁt share to player
i, x
0
i is the status quo (non-cooperative) gain of player i, and
N is the set of all players.
A high power index value reﬂects less power or a higher
willingness to cooperate. A stable allocation solution can
be achieved when power is distributed more or less equally
among the players (Dinar and Howitt, 1997). Therefore, the
coefﬁcient of variation of powers, also known as the stability
index (Sα) is used as an indicator of the stability of allocation
solutions:
Sα =
σα
α
, (27)
where σα is the standard deviation of powers and α is the
mean power. The lower the index, the more stable the alloca-
tion solution.
Given that cooperation in bankruptcy problems does not
have incremental beneﬁts and parties’ gains are zero in
the status quo, the power index is not readily quantiﬁable
in bankruptcy problems. Therefore, we propose a modiﬁed
power index (BPI) for bankruptcy problems as follows:
BPIi =
Si −υi P
jN
(Sj −υj)
iN,
X
iN
BPIi = 1, (28)
where:
Si =
n X
t=1
Si,t, (29)
υi =
n X
t=1
υi,t, (30)
BPIi is the bankruptcy power index (BPI) of riparian i, υi
is the sum of the conceded water to riparian i by all other
riparians in all time-steps in the overall planning horizon, N
is the set of riparians, and n is the number of time-steps in
the planning horizon (n = 12 months in the study example).
The bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) is then
equal to the coefﬁcient of variation of BPIs, which can be
used to evaluate the potential acceptability of a bankruptcy
solution:
BASI =
σBPI
BPI
, (31)
where σBPI is the standard deviation of riparian powers and
BPI is the mean power. The higher the index, the less stable
the allocation solution.
Table 2 shows the BASI value for each bankruptcy solu-
tion under a given hydrology for a unique claim set. Based
on this table, the CEL method is the most stable method un-
der the normal hydrology even though this method is not the
most popular method (based on the popularity index). Given
that stability (feasibility) is more important than popularity
(social optimality) in conﬂict resolution (Read et al., 2014)
we can conclude that CEL is the best mechanism for water
allocation in this bankruptcy example. Nevertheless, the sta-
bility of CEL is sensitive to hydrological conditions and this
method becomes the least stable allocation method under the
dry conditions. Under the dry hydrology, the P rule is the
most stable with lower demands. As demands increase, the
CEA method (the most popular method) becomes more sta-
ble. The changes in stability of allocation rule, with changes
in demand and hydrology show that the stability of alloca-
tion mechanisms is sensitive to both the hydrologic condi-
tions (water availability) and the claim set characteristics.
Future studies can focus on understanding the correlations of
the BASI of allocation rules with the claim set characteristics
(magnitude of claims, heterogeneity of claims, etc.) and the
resource availability conditions.
6 Conclusions
This work formed the basis and set practical guidelines for
developing allocation schemes for resolving transboundary
water allocation conﬂicts based using bankruptcy methods.
Although the suggested approach does not necessarily max-
imize the total welfare in the basin and might result in sub-
optimal allocations from an economic standpoint, it can be
used to develop practical solutions when side payments are
not feasible, parties are not highly cooperative (or not inter-
ested in implementing solutions based on conventional coop-
erative game theory solutions), and utility information is not
available or reliable.
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Considering the non-uniform spatial and temporal vari-
ability of water ﬂows, resulting in unequal access to water in
river systems, non-linear optimization models were proposed
for solving river bankruptcy problems. Four river bankruptcy
network ﬂow optimization models were developed based on
four conventional bankruptcy rules, i.e., proportional (P), ad-
justed proportional (AP), constrained equal award (CEA),
and constrained equal loss (CEL), for transboundary water
allocation. The models can be applied to any river network
(or bankruptcy network) problem, irrespective of its shape
and resource variability/accessibility conditions.
Acknowledging the difference in the notion of fairness
and the possibility of the rejection of suggested allocations
by the beneﬁciaries, who ﬁnd certain allocation rules un-
fair, there is a need for evaluating the acceptability of dif-
ferent bankruptcy solutions. While popularity of each solu-
tion is a simple indicator of its potential acceptability, it was
argued that in the case of asymmetric powers, the majority
cannot necessary determine the feasible solution, especially
when powerful parties do not support the most popular so-
lution. Therefore, a new index (bankruptcy allocation sta-
bility index (BASI)) was formulated for evaluating the po-
tential acceptability/stability of allocation solutions with re-
spect to the distribution of claims and dissatisfaction among
the beneﬁciaries.
The evaluation of the stability of different bankruptcy al-
location solutions for different water demand and hydrologic
scenarios in the example case suggested that acceptability
is sensitive to both water demand (claim) and water avail-
ability. This ﬁnding has a signiﬁcant policy implication for
transboundary water management, suggesting that inﬂexible
water allocation agreements and treaties that have been de-
veloped based on stationary assumptions are not resilient,
especially in face of expected socioeconomic and climatic
changes.
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